A consolidated and accessible security proof for finite-size decoy-state quantum key distribution
Abstract
In recent years, quantum key distribution (QKD) has evolved from a scientific research field to a commercially viable security solution, supported by mathematically formulated security proofs. However, since the knowledge required for a full understanding of a security proof is scattered across numerous publications, it has proven difficult to gain a comprehensive understanding of each step involved in the process and their limitations without considerable effort and attention to detail. Our paper aims to address this issue by presenting an accessible and comprehensive security proof for the finite-size 1-decoy (and 2-decoy) BB84 protocol in Renner's entropic uncertainty relation framework. We extensively consolidate and unify concepts from many works, thoroughly discussing the underlying assumptions and resolving technical inconsistencies. This work can serve as a foundation for the discussion of QKD security and for the identification of potential vulnerabilities and device imperfections. Our step-by-step approach and consistent notation assumes no prior exposure to security proofs, making it a robust and comprehensible reference, while maintaining theoretical rigor. Therefore, our contribution represents a significant advancement towards a broader understanding of QKD security proofs.
- Publication:
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arXiv e-prints
- Pub Date:
- May 2024
- DOI:
- 10.48550/arXiv.2405.16578
- arXiv:
- arXiv:2405.16578
- Bibcode:
- 2024arXiv240516578W
- Keywords:
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- Quantum Physics