A Novel Evaluation Framework for Assessing Resilience Against Prompt Injection Attacks in Large Language Models
Abstract
Prompt injection attacks exploit vulnerabilities in large language models (LLMs) to manipulate the model into unintended actions or generate malicious content. As LLM integrated applications gain wider adoption, they face growing susceptibility to such attacks. This study introduces a novel evaluation framework for quantifying the resilience of applications. The framework incorporates innovative techniques designed to ensure representativeness, interpretability, and robustness. To ensure the representativeness of simulated attacks on the application, a meticulous selection process was employed, resulting in 115 carefully chosen attacks based on coverage and relevance. For enhanced interpretability, a second LLM was utilized to evaluate the responses generated from these simulated attacks. Unlike conventional malicious content classifiers that provide only a confidence score, the LLM-based evaluation produces a score accompanied by an explanation, thereby enhancing interpretability. Subsequently, a resilience score is computed by assigning higher weights to attacks with greater impact, thus providing a robust measurement of the application resilience. To assess the framework's efficacy, it was applied on two LLMs, namely Llama2 and ChatGLM. Results revealed that Llama2, the newer model exhibited higher resilience compared to ChatGLM. This finding substantiates the effectiveness of the framework, aligning with the prevailing notion that newer models tend to possess greater resilience. Moreover, the framework exhibited exceptional versatility, requiring only minimal adjustments to accommodate emerging attack techniques and classifications, thereby establishing itself as an effective and practical solution. Overall, the framework offers valuable insights that empower organizations to make well-informed decisions to fortify their applications against potential threats from prompt injection.
- Publication:
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arXiv e-prints
- Pub Date:
- January 2024
- DOI:
- 10.48550/arXiv.2401.00991
- arXiv:
- arXiv:2401.00991
- Bibcode:
- 2024arXiv240100991W
- Keywords:
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- Computer Science - Cryptography and Security
- E-Print:
- Accepted to be published in the Proceedings of The 10th IEEE CSDE 2023, the Asia-Pacific Conference on Computer Science and Data Engineering 2023