Forensic Seismology in the United Kingdom
Abstract
In the 1950s there was growing international concern with the possible spread of nuclear weapons. One proposed way of curbing the spread was to ban nuclear tests. Negotiations for a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) began as a consequence. A CTBT was successfully negotiated in September 1996, but has still to enter into force. One key element of the CTBT verification regime is the 321 stations (currently 88% complete) within the International Monitoring System (IMS) which are to detect and identify nuclear test explosions. One of the main reasons the Treaty took so long to negotiate was that it was repeatedly argued that any monitoring network would be inadequate and so would not provide a strong enough deterrent to States keen to test clandestinely. The most difficult explosions to detect and identify turned out to be those fired underground. Consequently there has been a large research effort to recognise underground nuclear explosions (UNE). Seismic signals from UNEs of significant size are detected at distant stations. The challenge then is to recognise the explosion amid all the naturally occurring earthquakes. A new branch of seismology --- forensic seismology --- has developed to improve methods of detecting seismic signals, recognising UNEs, and estimating their yield. The research in forensic seismology has also contributed to seismology in general. Here we describe some of the work carried out by the UK research group at AWE Blacknest, including: the use of seismometer arrays; group estimation of epicentres; and estimating unbiased magnitudes.
© British Crown Owned Copyright 2019/AWE- Publication:
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AGU Fall Meeting Abstracts
- Pub Date:
- December 2019
- Bibcode:
- 2019AGUFM.S14B..03N
- Keywords:
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- 7219 Seismic monitoring and test-ban treaty verification;
- SEISMOLOGY;
- 7294 Seismic instruments and networks;
- SEISMOLOGY;
- 7299 General or miscellaneous;
- SEISMOLOGY