Alea Iacta Est: Auctions, Persuasion, Interim Rules, and Dice
Abstract
To select a subset of samples or "winners" from a population of candidates, order sampling [Rosen 1997] and the kunit Myerson auction [Myerson 1981] share a common scheme: assign a (random) score to each candidate, then select the k candidates with the highest scores. We study a generalization of both order sampling and Myerson's allocation rule, called winnerselecting dice. The setting for winnerselecting dice is similar to auctions with feasibility constraints: candidates have random types drawn from independent prior distributions, and the winner set must be feasible subject to certain constraints. Dice (distributions over scores) are assigned to each type, and winners are selected to maximize the sum of the dice rolls, subject to the feasibility constraints. We examine the existence of winnerselecting dice that implement prescribed probabilities of winning (i.e., an interim rule) for all types. Our first result shows that when the feasibility constraint is a matroid, then for any feasible interim rule, there always exist winnerselecting dice that implement it. Unfortunately, our proof does not yield an efficient algorithm for constructing the dice. In the special case of a 1uniform matroid, i.e., only one winner can be selected, we give an efficient algorithm that constructs winnerselecting dice for any feasible interim rule. Furthermore, when the types of the candidates are drawn in an i.i.d.~manner and the interim rule is symmetric across candidates, unsurprisingly, an algorithm can efficiently construct symmetric dice that only depend on the type but not the identity of the candidate.
 Publication:

arXiv eprints
 Pub Date:
 November 2018
 arXiv:
 arXiv:1811.11417
 Bibcode:
 2018arXiv181111417D
 Keywords:

 Computer Science  Computer Science and Game Theory
 EPrint:
 ITCS 2019