Safe and Nested Subgame Solving for Imperfect-Information Games
Abstract
In imperfect-information games, the optimal strategy in a subgame may depend on the strategy in other, unreached subgames. Thus a subgame cannot be solved in isolation and must instead consider the strategy for the entire game as a whole, unlike perfect-information games. Nevertheless, it is possible to first approximate a solution for the whole game and then improve it by solving individual subgames. This is referred to as subgame solving. We introduce subgame-solving techniques that outperform prior methods both in theory and practice. We also show how to adapt them, and past subgame-solving techniques, to respond to opponent actions that are outside the original action abstraction; this significantly outperforms the prior state-of-the-art approach, action translation. Finally, we show that subgame solving can be repeated as the game progresses down the game tree, leading to far lower exploitability. These techniques were a key component of Libratus, the first AI to defeat top humans in heads-up no-limit Texas hold'em poker.
- Publication:
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arXiv e-prints
- Pub Date:
- May 2017
- DOI:
- 10.48550/arXiv.1705.02955
- arXiv:
- arXiv:1705.02955
- Bibcode:
- 2017arXiv170502955B
- Keywords:
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- Computer Science - Artificial Intelligence;
- Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory