Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes for Allocation of Indivisible Objects
Abstract
In AAMAS 2014, Bouveret and Lemaitre (2014) presented a hierarchy of fairness concepts for allocation of indivisible objects. Among them CEEI (Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) was the strongest. In this note, we settle the complexity of computing a discrete CEEI assignment by showing it is strongly NP-hard. We then highlight a fairness notion (CEEI-FRAC) that is even stronger than CEEI for discrete assignments, is always Pareto optimal, and can be verified in polynomial time. We also show that computing a CEEI-FRAC discrete assignment is strongly NP-hard in general but polynomial-time computable if the utilities are zero or one.
- Publication:
-
arXiv e-prints
- Pub Date:
- January 2015
- DOI:
- 10.48550/arXiv.1501.06627
- arXiv:
- arXiv:1501.06627
- Bibcode:
- 2015arXiv150106627A
- Keywords:
-
- Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory;
- 91A12;
- 68Q15;
- F.2;
- J.4
- E-Print:
- 6 pages