Group interest versus self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy
Abstract
The recent threat of bioterrorism has fueled debate on smallpox vaccination policy for the United States. Certain policy proposals call for voluntary mass vaccination; however, if individuals decide whether to vaccinate according to self-interest, the level of herd immunity achieved may differ from what is best for the population as a whole. We present a synthesis of game theory and epidemic modeling that formalizes this conflict between self-interest and group interest and shows that voluntary vaccination is unlikely to reach the group-optimal level. This shortfall results in a substantial increase in expected mortality after an attack.
- Publication:
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Proceedings of the National Academy of Science
- Pub Date:
- September 2003
- DOI:
- 10.1073/pnas.1731324100
- Bibcode:
- 2003PNAS..10010564B
- Keywords:
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- Applied Mathematics / Population Biology