Strategyproof allocation with outside option
Abstract
Strategyproof mechanisms are widely used in market design. In an abstract allocation framework where outside options are available to agents, we obtain two results for strategyproof mechanisms. They provide a unified foundation for several existing results in distinct models and imply new results in some models. The first result proves that, for individually rational and strategyproof mechanisms, pinning down every agent's probability of choosing his outside option is equivalent to pinning down a mechanism. The second result provides a sufficient condition for two strategyproof mechanisms to be equivalent when the number of possible allocations is finite.
 Publication:

arXiv eprints
 Pub Date:
 September 2020
 arXiv:
 arXiv:2009.05311
 Bibcode:
 2020arXiv200905311Z
 Keywords:

 Economics  Theoretical Economics
 EPrint:
 35 pages