The structure of twovalued strategyproof social choice functions with indifference
Abstract
We give a structure theorem for all coalitionally strategyproof social choice functions whose range is a subset of cardinality two of a given larger set of alternatives. We provide this in the case where the voters/agents are allowed to express indifference and the domain consists of profiles of preferences over a society of arbitrary cardinality. The theorem, that takes the form of a representation formula, can be used to construct all functions under consideration.
 Publication:

arXiv eprints
 Pub Date:
 February 2020
 DOI:
 10.48550/arXiv.2002.06341
 arXiv:
 arXiv:2002.06341
 Bibcode:
 2020arXiv200206341B
 Keywords:

 Economics  Theoretical Economics;
 91B14
 EPrint:
 JEL Code: D71