Efficient Energy Distribution in a Smart Grid using MultiPlayer Games
Abstract
Algorithms and models based on game theory have nowadays become prominent techniques for the design of digital controllers for critical systems. Indeed, such techniques enable automatic synthesis: given a model of the environment and a property that the controller must enforce, those techniques automatically produce a correct controller, when it exists. In the present paper, we consider a class of concurrent, weighted, multiplayer games that are wellsuited to model and study the interactions of several agents who are competing for some measurable resources like energy. We prove that a subclass of those games always admit a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which all players play in such a way that they have no incentive to deviate. Moreover, the strategies yielding those Nash equilibria have a special structure: when one of the agents deviate from the equilibrium, all the others form a coalition that will enforce a retaliation mechanism that punishes the deviant agent. We apply those results to a reallife case study in which several smart houses that produce their own energy with solar panels, and can share this energy among them in microgrid, must distribute the use of this energy along the day in order to avoid consuming electricity that must be bought from the global grid. We demonstrate that our theory allows one to synthesise an efficient controller for these houses: using penalties to be paid in the utility bill as an incentive, we force the houses to follow a precomputed schedule that maximises the proportion of the locally produced energy that is consumed.
 Publication:

arXiv eprints
 Pub Date:
 August 2016
 arXiv:
 arXiv:1608.00652
 Bibcode:
 2016arXiv160800652B
 Keywords:

 Computer Science  Computer Science and Game Theory
 EPrint:
 In Proceedings Cassting'16/SynCoP'16, arXiv:1608.00177