Interdependent Security with Strategic Agents and Cascades of Infection
Abstract
We investigate cascades in networks consisting of strategic agents with interdependent security. We assume that the strategic agents have choices between i) investing in protecting themselves, ii) purchasing insurance to transfer (some) risks, and iii) taking no actions. Using a population game model, we study how various system parameters, such as node degrees, infection propagation rate, and the probability with which infected nodes transmit infection to neighbors, affect nodes' choices at Nash equilibria and the resultant price of anarchy/stability. In addition, we examine how the probability that a single infected node can spread the infection to a significant portion of the entire network, called cascade probability, behaves with respect to system parameters. In particular, we demonstrate that, at least for some parameter regimes, the cascade probability increases with the average degree of nodes.
 Publication:

arXiv eprints
 Pub Date:
 February 2015
 arXiv:
 arXiv:1502.07414
 Bibcode:
 2015arXiv150207414L
 Keywords:

 Computer Science  Social and Information Networks;
 Computer Science  Computer Science and Game Theory;
 Physics  Physics and Society
 EPrint:
 16 pages, 6 figures