Signed Networks, Triadic Interactions and the Evolution of Cooperation
Abstract
We outline a model to study the evolution of cooperation in a population of agents playing the prisoner's dilemma in signed networks. We highlight that if only dyadic interactions are taken into account, cooperation never evolves. However, when triadic considerations are introduced, a window of opportunity for emergence of cooperation as a stable behaviour emerges.
- Publication:
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arXiv e-prints
- Pub Date:
- September 2013
- DOI:
- 10.48550/arXiv.1309.7698
- arXiv:
- arXiv:1309.7698
- Bibcode:
- 2013arXiv1309.7698R
- Keywords:
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- Computer Science - Social and Information Networks;
- Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory;
- Computer Science - Neural and Evolutionary Computing;
- Physics - Physics and Society
- E-Print:
- In Proceedings Wivace 2013, arXiv:1309.7122