Evolutionary instability of zerodeterminant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything
Abstract
Zerodeterminant strategies are a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies that are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner’s Dilemma irrespective of the opponent’s strategy (coercive strategies), or else to set the ratio between the player’s and their opponent’s expected payoff (extortionate strategies). Here we show that zerodeterminant strategies are at most weakly dominant, are not evolutionarily stable, and will instead evolve into less coercive strategies. We show that zerodeterminant strategies with an informational advantage over other players that allows them to recognize each other can be evolutionarily stable (and able to exploit other players). However, such an advantage is bound to be shortlived as opposing strategies evolve to counteract the recognition.
 Publication:

Nature Communications
 Pub Date:
 August 2013
 DOI:
 10.1038/ncomms3193
 arXiv:
 arXiv:1208.2666
 Bibcode:
 2013NatCo...4.2193A
 Keywords:

 Quantitative Biology  Populations and Evolution;
 Nonlinear Sciences  Adaptation and SelfOrganizing Systems;
 Quantitative Biology  Neurons and Cognition
 EPrint:
 14 pages, 4 figures. Change in title (again!) to comply with Nature Communications requirements. To appear in Nature Communications