Does Integration Help Adapt to Climate Change? Case of Increased US Corn Yield Volatility

In absence of of new crop varieties or significant shifts in the geography of corn production, US national corn yields variation could double by the year 2040 as a result of climate change and without adaptation this could lead the variability in US corn prices to quadruple (Diffenbaugh et al. 2012). In addition to climate induced price changes, analysis of recent commodity price spikes suggests that interventionist trade policies are partly to blame. Assuming we cannot much influence the future climate outcome, what policies can we undertake to adapt better? Can we use markets to blunt this edge? Diffenbaugh et al. find that sale of corn- ethanol for use in liquid fuel, when governed by quotas such as US Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), could make US corn prices even more variable; in contrast the same food-fuel market link (we refer to it as intersectoral link) may well dampen price volatility when the sale of corn to ethanol industry is driven by higher future oil prices. The latter however comes at the cost of exposing corn prices to the greater volatility in oil markets. Similarly intervention in corn trade can make US corn prices less or more volatile by distorting international corn price transmission. A negative US corn yield shock shows that domestic corn supply falls and domestic prices to go up irrespective of whether or not markets are integrated. How much the prices go up depends on how much demand adjusts to accommodate the supply shock. Based on the forgoing analysis, one should expect that demand would adjust more readily when markets are integrated and therefore reduce the resulting price fluctuation. Simulation results confirm this response of corn markets. In terms of relative comparisons however a policy driven intersectoral integration is least effective and prices rise much more. Similarly, a positive world oil price shock makes the US oil imports expensive and with oil being used to produce gasoline blends, it increases the price of gasoline and reduces its demand. In the presence of domestic integration, ethanol production rises to substitute oil in the gasoline blend and thereby increases the corn demand and prices. However if one takes into account increase in corn price due to increased production costs (increase in oil price increases fertilizer prices - a major input into corn production) and reduced corn prices due to reduced fuel demand and therefore reduced ethanol additive demand; the prices can go either way. Our initial simulations show that they do in fact go down with mandate driven integration. This raises some more general questions: Whether integration (intersectoral and international) can be an effective strategy for adapting to climate change? And which of the four adaptation options - RFS or oil price driven domestic integration, full corn tariff liberalization or restricting tariff manipulation by partners - would be more effective in comparison to other adaptation (including no adaptation) scenarios? We implement the alternative adaptation strategies, while sampling from the same corn yield and oil price distributions and compare the resulting corn price variations to the base case where no such adaptation has been undertaken. Our initial results suggest that intersectoral integration is more effective form of adaptation than international one, but only if driven by market forces and not mandates.