Ontological and Epistemological Issues Regarding Climate Models and Computer Experiments

Recent philosophical discussions (Parker 2009; Frigg and Reiss 2009; Winsberg, 2009; Morgon 2002, 2003, 2005; Gula 2002) about the ontology of computer simulation experiments and the epistemology of inferences drawn from them are of particular relevance to climate science as computer modeling and analysis are instrumental in understanding climatic systems. How do computer simulation experiments compare with traditional experiments? Is there an ontological difference between these two methods of inquiry? Are there epistemological considerations that result in one type of inference being more reliable than the other? What are the implications of these questions with respect to climate studies that rely on computer simulation analysis? In this paper, I examine these philosophical questions within the context of climate science, instantiating concerns in the philosophical literature with examples found in analysis of global climate change. I concentrate on Wendy Parker’s (2009) account of computer simulation studies, which offers a treatment of these and other questions relevant to investigations of climate change involving such modelling. Two theses at the center of Parker’s account will be the focus of this paper. The first is that computer simulation experiments ought to be regarded as straightforward material experiments; which is to say, there is no significant ontological difference between computer and traditional experimentation. Parker’s second thesis is that some of the emphasis on the epistemological importance of materiality has been misplaced. I examine both of these claims. First, I inquire as to whether viewing computer and traditional experiments as ontologically similar in the way she does implies that there is no proper distinction between abstract experiments (such as ‘thought experiments’ as well as computer experiments) and traditional ‘concrete’ ones. Second, I examine the notion of materiality (i.e., the material commonality between object and target systems) and some arguments for the claim that materiality entails some inferential advantage to traditional experimentation. I maintain that Parker’s account of the ontology of computer simulations has some interesting though potentially problematic implications regarding conventional distinctions between abstract and concrete methods of inquiry. With respect to her account of materiality, I outline and defend an alternative account, posited by Mary Morgan (2002, 2003, 2005), which holds that ontological similarity between target and object systems confers some epistemological advantage to traditional forms of experimental inquiry.