A Defence of the AR4’s Bayesian Approach to Quantifying Uncertainty

The field of climate change research is a kimberlite pipe filled with philosophic diamonds waiting to be mined and analyzed by philosophers. Within the scientific literature on climate change, there is much philosophical dialogue regarding the methods and implications of climate studies. To this date, however, discourse regarding the philosophy of climate science has been confined predominately to scientific - rather than philosophical - investigations. In this paper, I hope to bring one such issue to the surface for explicit philosophical analysis: The purpose of this paper is to address a philosophical debate pertaining to the expressions of uncertainty in the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), which, as will be noted, has received significant attention in scientific journals and books, as well as sporadic glances from the popular press. My thesis is that the AR4’s Bayesian method of uncertainty analysis and uncertainty expression is justifiable on pragmatic grounds: it overcomes problems associated with vagueness, thereby facilitating communication between scientists and policy makers such that the latter can formulate decision analyses in response to the views of the former. Further, I argue that the most pronounced criticisms against the AR4’s Bayesian approach, which are outlined below, are misguided. §1 Introduction Central to AR4 is a list of terms related to uncertainty that in colloquial conversations would be considered vague. The IPCC attempts to reduce the vagueness of its expressions of uncertainty by calibrating uncertainty terms with numerical probability values derived from a subjective Bayesian methodology. This style of analysis and expression has stimulated some controversy, as critics reject as inappropriate and even misleading the association of uncertainty terms with Bayesian probabilities. [...] The format of the paper is as follows. The investigation begins (§2) with an explanation of background considerations relevant to the IPCC and its use of uncertainty expressions. It then (§3) outlines some general philosophical worries regarding vague expressions and (§4) relates those worries to the AR4 and its method of dealing with them, which is a subjective Bayesian probability analysis. The next phase of the paper (§5) examines the notions of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ probability interpretations and compares the IPCC’s subjective Bayesian strategy with a frequentist approach. It then (§6) addresses objections to that methodology, and concludes (§7) that those objections are wrongheaded.