Enhancement of cooperation in highly clustered scale-free networks
Abstract
We study the effect of clustering on the organization of cooperation by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” on scale-free networks with a tunable value of clustering. We find, on the one hand, that a high value of the clustering coefficient produces an overall enhancement of cooperation in the network, even for a very high temptation to defect. On the other hand, high clustering homogenizes the process of invasion of degree classes by defectors, decreasing the chances of survival of low densities of cooperators in the network.
- Publication:
-
Physical Review E
- Pub Date:
- July 2008
- DOI:
- 10.1103/PhysRevE.78.017101
- arXiv:
- arXiv:0801.2146
- Bibcode:
- 2008PhRvE..78a7101A
- Keywords:
-
- 89.75.Fb;
- 87.23.Ge;
- 02.50.Le;
- Structures and organization in complex systems;
- Dynamics of social systems;
- Decision theory and game theory;
- Physics - Physics and Society
- E-Print:
- 4 pages, 3 figures