As many countries are moving towards water sector reforms, practical issues of how water management institutions can better effect allocation, regulation and enforcement of water rights have emerged. The uncertainty associated with water that is available at a particular diversion point becomes a parameter that is likely to influence the behavior of water users as to their application for water licenses, as well as their willingness to pay for licensed use. The ability of a water agency to reduce this uncertainty through effective water rights enforcement is related to the fiscal ability of the agency to sustain the enforcement effort. In this paper, this interplay across the users and the agency is explored, considering the hydraulic structure or sequence of water use, and parameters that define the users and the agency's economics. The potential for free rider behavior by the users, as well as their proposals for licensed use are derived conditional on this setting. The analyses presented are developed in the framework of the theory of "Law and Economics", with user interactions modeled as a game theoretic enterprise. The state of Ceara, Brazil is used loosely as an example setting, with parameter values for the experiments indexed to be approximately those relevant for current decisions. The potential for using the ideas in participatory decision making is discussed.
AGU Fall Meeting Abstracts
- Pub Date:
- December 2007
- 1880 Water management (6334);
- 1884 Water supply