Coevolutionary games on networks
Abstract
We study agents on a network playing an iterated Prisoner's dilemma against their neighbors. The resulting spatially extended coevolutionary game exhibits stationary states which are Nash equilibria. After perturbation of these equilibria, avalanches of mutations reestablish a stationary state. Scale-free avalanche distributions are observed that are in accordance with calculations from the Nash equilibria and a confined branching process. The transition from subcritical to critical avalanche dynamics can be traced to a change in the degeneracy of the cooperative macrostate and is observed for many variants of this game.
- Publication:
-
Physical Review E
- Pub Date:
- November 2002
- DOI:
- 10.1103/PhysRevE.66.056118
- arXiv:
- arXiv:cond-mat/0208273
- Bibcode:
- 2002PhRvE..66e6118E
- Keywords:
-
- 02.50.Le;
- 87.23.Kg;
- 89.75.Hc;
- 89.75.Da;
- Decision theory and game theory;
- Dynamics of evolution;
- Networks and genealogical trees;
- Systems obeying scaling laws;
- Condensed Matter - Disordered Systems and Neural Networks;
- Condensed Matter - Statistical Mechanics
- E-Print:
- 9 pages RevTeX, 5 figures PostScript