The Storage, Transportation, and Disposal of Nuclear Waste
Abstract
The U.S. Congress established a comprehensive federal policy to dispose of wastes from nuclear reactors and defense facilities, centered on deep geologic disposal of high-level radioactive waste. Site screening led to selection of three potential sites and in 1987, Congress directed the Secretary of Energy to characterize only one site: Yucca Mountain in Nevada. For more than 20 years, teams of scientists and engineers have been evaluating the potential suitability of the site. On the basis of their work, the U.S. Secretary of Energy, Spencer Abraham, concluded in February 2002 that a safe repository can be sited at Yucca Mountain. On July 23, 2002, President Bush signed Joint Resolution 87 approving the site at Yucca Mountain for development of a repository, which allows the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to prepare and submit a license application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Concerns have been raised relative to the safe transportation of nuclear materials. The U.S. history of transportation of nuclear materials demonstrates that high-level nuclear materials can be safely transported. Since the 1960s, over 1.6 million miles have been traveled by more than 2,700 spent nuclear fuel shipments, and there has never been an accident severe enough to cause a release of radioactive materials. The DOE will use NRC-certified casks that must be able to withstand very stringent tests. The same design features that allow the casks to survive severe accidents also limit their vulnerability to sabotage. In addition, the NRC will approve all shipping routes and security plans. With regard to long-term safety, the Yucca Mountain disposal system has five key attributes. First, the arid climate and geology of Yucca Mountain combine to ensure that limited water will enter the emplacement tunnels. Second, the DOE has designed a waste package and drip shield that are expected to have very long lifetimes in the repository environment. Third, waste form solubilities limit radionuclide releases, and the invert material below the package would further delay radionuclide movement. Fourth, rock units in the unsaturated and saturated zone at Yucca Mountain will delay and dilute any radionuclides that have migrated away from the emplacement tunnels. Fifth, disruptions due to volcanism, seismic events, or nuclear criticality have been evaluated and all are shown to have very low likelihood of causing unacceptable doses. Volcanism could result in a small, but calculable, dose during the regulatory period of 10,000 years.
- Publication:
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AGU Fall Meeting Abstracts
- Pub Date:
- December 2002
- Bibcode:
- 2002AGUFM.U11B..03Y
- Keywords:
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- 6600 PUBLIC ISSUES