Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
Abstract
We prove that the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution is secure. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement purification based protocol uses CalderbankShorSteane codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the LoChau protocol.
 Publication:

Physical Review Letters
 Pub Date:
 July 2000
 DOI:
 10.1103/PhysRevLett.85.441
 arXiv:
 arXiv:quantph/0003004
 Bibcode:
 2000PhRvL..85..441S
 Keywords:

 Quantum Physics
 EPrint:
 5 pages, Latex, minor changes to improve clarity and fix typos